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This paper jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder distributions
following a 2003 reduction in the dividend and capital gains tax rates for individuals.  We find that
directors and officers, but not other individual investors, rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax
returns in light of the new tax rules.  We also find that firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically,
dividends versus share repurchases) in a manner consistent with the altered tax incentives for individual
investors.  To our knowledge, this is the first paper to employ simultaneous equations to estimate both
investor and managerial responses to the 2003 rate reductions.  We find that estimating a system of





1315 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall
Philadelphia, PA  19104-6365
blouin@wharton.upenn.edu
Jana Raedy
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Kenan-Flagler Business School
Campus Box 3490, McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC  27599-3490
jana_raedy@unc.edu
Douglas Shackelford
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Kenan-Flagler Business School
Campus Box 3490, McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC  27599-3490
and NBER
doug_shack@unc.eduI.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder 
distributions following a 2003 reduction in dividend and capital gains tax rates.  We predict that 
individual investors, the only ones affected by the reduction in shareholder taxes, rebalanced 
their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns in light of the new tax rules.  We also predict that 
firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically, dividends versus share repurchases) to 
maximize share value, i.e., distributing profits in a manner that was most attractive to their 
investors after considering shareholder taxes.  With regard to investor responses, we find 
evidence that insiders (i.e., directors and officers) increased holdings in their own companies if 
their dividend-repurchase mix reflected the new tax incentives.  However, we find no evidence 
that other individual investors rebalanced their portfolios.  With regard to managerial responses, 
we find that firms with disproportionately large individual holdings modified their payouts in a 
manner consistent with the altered tax incentives.  However, changes in dividend and repurchase 
policy were not immediate; firms deferred widespread, substantial changes until the second 
quarter following enactment.  
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to jointly estimate investor and firm responses to 
changes in shareholder taxes.  The fact that both investors and firms can change their behavior 
following a change in shareholder taxes presents an identification problem.  To illustrate, 
suppose we test for an association between dividend yields and individual stock ownership and 
find that the correlation becomes more positive following a reduction in individual dividend tax 
rates.  Such a finding is consistent with both (1) individuals switching to high-dividend-paying 
firms following the tax cut (i.e., a tax clientele response) and (2) firms that are held mostly by 
individuals increasing their dividends following the tax reduction (a firm payout response).  To 2 
 
distinguish between investors’ rebalancing their portfolios and firms’ altering their distributions, 
this study estimates simultaneous equations.  Prior studies have focused on either investors or 
managers, but not both.   
To maximize the power of our tests, we compare a firm’s ownership and dividend-
repurchase mix before and after the largest change in U.S. dividend taxation.  The Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) reduced, for individuals only, the 
maximum, statutory dividend tax rate from 38.6% to 15%.  It also lowered the maximum, 
statutory individual capital gains tax rate, which applies to share repurchases, from 20% to 15%.  
In many ways, JGTRRA is an ideal legislative setting for testing an association between 
shareholder taxes and payout policy.  The scope of JGTRRA was narrow.  Its genesis was 
individual dividend tax reduction.  Its primary amendment was individual capital gains tax 
relief.
1  The final bill did little more than reduce dividend and capital gains tax rates.  
Nonetheless, the economic effects were huge.
2   Because of its narrow focus and big impact, the 
JGTRRA provides a much stronger setting than other shareholder tax rate changes, which were 
either much smaller (e.g., Tax Relief Act of 1997) or involved widespread overhaul of the tax 
system that affected far more than just shareholder taxes (Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
  The JGTRRA dividend and capital gains tax cuts should have altered the optimal mix of 
dividends and repurchases for at least some individual investors.  As a result, we expect that 
some individuals rebalanced their portfolio so that a higher proportion of their equity returns 
came in the form of dividends.  Consistent with such portfolio rebalancing, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2010) report that total U.S. equity investments shifted from foreign countries 
                                                           
1 For the legislative history, see Auerbach and Hassett (2006). 
2 The size of the tax savings has been very large.  In September 2007, the U.S. Congress’ Joint Committee on 
Taxation reported that the 2003 dividend and capital gains tax rates will cost the Treasury $632 billion between 
2007 and 2011, the largest tax expenditure in the tax code. 3 
 
whose companies did not qualify for the lower dividend tax rates to foreign countries whose 
companies did quality for the lower dividend tax rates.  However, to our knowledge, no one has 
documented whether individual investors rebalanced their much larger holdings of domestic 
holdings in a manner consistent with the changed tax incentives following passage of the 
JGTRRA.  This study addresses this void by studying the domestic portfolio rebalancing of three 
different individual investor groups. 
To attract individual investors who were looking for more dividends following passage of 
the legislation, we expect that at least some firms increased the dividend portion of their 
distributions.  Consistent with such a managerial response, Chetty and Saez (2005) document 
that dividend initiations jumped in 2003.  Brown et al. (2007) add that reductions in share 
repurchases funded these 2003 dividend initiations and such substitution was limited to 
companies where directors and officers held disproportionately large shares.  They find no 
similar managerial responses among the set of firms that account for almost all dividend 
issuances, i.e., the firms paying dividends before JGTRRA, or among firms without high insider 
ownership.
3  Comparing executive compensation in 2003 and 2002, Aboody and Kasznik (2008) 
also reach mixed conclusions about the changes in the dividend–repurchase mix.   
We conduct a more comprehensive study of the managerial responses to JGTRRA by 
looking at dividend-paying firms (which far exceed initiators in number and payout), studying 
both insiders and other individual investors, and extending the analysis to include changes in 
distribution policies through 2005 (two years beyond these extant JGTRRA studies).  
                                                           
3 Brown et al. (2007) are careful to state that their inferences about substitution are limited to 2003 dividend 
initiators.  That said, because their sample includes both initiators and non-initiating firms, it was unclear to us 
whether the findings reported in Table VI of their paper shed any light on the firm responses of non-initiators.  
Private conversations with the authors confirmed that their conclusions were limited to 2003 dividend initiators.  In 
addition, to enable us to investigate the non-initiators in their study more closely, the authors kindly provided us 
with their data for which we were most appreciative.  We replicated their results, and, consistent with the inferences 
in their paper and our conversations with them, we found that their results only hold for firms that initiated in 2003. 4 
 
Lengthening the investigation period enables us to calibrate how long it took investors and 
managers to respond to JGTRRA.  We also estimate a system of equations and find that results 
are statistically and economically more significant under simultaneous equations than they are 
under ordinary least squares.   
To test for investor and firm responses, we compare the percentage of shares held before 
and after JGTRRA for three groups of individual investors: insiders (i.e., directors and officers of 
the firm), other non-executive individuals investing on their own account, and mutual fund 
investors.
4  We aggregate each firm’s dividends and repurchases during the eight quarters 
immediately preceding the quarter of enactment and compute the ratio of dividends to total 
payout (dividends plus repurchases).
5  We compare that ratio to the one formed with aggregated 
dividends and repurchases for the eight quarters immediately after the quarter of enactment.  We 
then test for an association between the change in shareholders and change in the dividend-
repurchase mix.  This difference-in-differences approach mitigates the likelihood of spurious 
conclusions arising from omitted correlated variables.  Estimating a system of equations enables 
us to determine whether the association is driven by tax clientele effects, payout changes, or 
both.   
We find evidence consistent with both investor and firm responses to JGTRRA.  
However, insiders are the only investors who appear to have altered their holdings in response to 
JGTRRA.  We find stronger evidence that firms modified their payout policy in response to 
changes in shareholder taxes.  In particular, we find that the movement toward distributing a 
larger proportion of profits as dividends was greatest among those companies held 
                                                           
4 Many mutual fund investors are not individuals and the earnings for many mutual funds held by individuals are not 
subject to JGTRRA, e.g., 401(k) investments.  Unfortunately, we cannot observe the extent to which JGTRRA 
affects specific mutual funds’ investor base.  This limitation biases against our finding a response by mutual fund 
investors. 
5 We aggregate to reduce some of the noise arising because repurchases, unlike regular quarterly dividends, are 
uneven and irregular. 5 
 
disproportionately by individual investors, particularly directors and officers, but also those firms 
where other individual and mutual funds had large holdings.  We find that firms began to 
substantially alter their distribution policies in the second quarter following passage, consistent 
with firms needing time to adjust their dividend and repurchase policies.  
The next section develops testable hypotheses.  Section III details the research design.  
Section IV presents the empirical findings.  Closing remarks follow. 
 
II.  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Framework 
This paper does not attempt to tackle the longstanding puzzle of why firms pay dividends 
when they could distribute profits through share repurchases, which remain tax-advantaged, 
though less so, even after JGTRRA.
6  Rather, in a nutshell, we: (a) accept the fact that investors 
desired and some firms paid dividends before JGTRRA (obviously for non-tax reasons), (b) 
assume that the mix of dividends and repurchases was optimal before passage of the legislation, 
(c) expect that the large tax rate reductions for dividends (compared with the relatively modest 
reductions for capital gains) led some individuals to rebalance their portfolios in favor of 
dividend income, and (d) predict that some firms, in response to the changing tax incentives for 
individual investors, increased the portion of their distributions in the form of dividends after 
JGTRRA.  The remainder of this section elaborates on these relations to develop formal 
hypotheses about the impact of JGTRRA on shareholder distributions. 
                                                           
6 For a sampling of the “dividend puzzle” literature, see Miller and Modigliani (1961), Feldstein and Green (1983), 
Bagwell and Shoven (1989), Berhheim (1991), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000), Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (2000), Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Dhaliwal and Li (2006), Gordon and 
Dietz, 2006 and Chetty and Saez, 2007, among many others.  On a different note, even though both repurchases and 
dividends now face a maximum tax rate of 15%, repurchases remain tax-advantaged for at least two reasons.  First, 
sellers can offset the tax basis of the shares that they sell against the proceeds from the sale in computing their 
capital gains.  Second, they can offset those capital gains with capital losses that otherwise might not be deductible.  
This contrasts with dividends, where the entire amount is taxed upon receipt. 6 
 
To develop the intuition for our hypotheses, we start with a simple framework.
7  Absent 
taxes, suppose that all investors hold optimally diversified portfolios of the risk-free asset and the 
market portfolio.  In that setting, shareholder ownership of stocks should not vary across 
investors with similar risk preferences.  Now suppose some investors (call them individuals) 
become taxed on their dividend income.  These individual investors will no longer hold the 
original, pre-tax, optimally diversified portfolio.  Rather, they will underweight their portfolio in 
tax-disfavored dividend-paying stocks and overweight their portfolio in tax-favored, no-dividend 
stocks.  This shift will boost the price of no-dividend stocks and drive down the price of 
dividend-paying stocks.  These price movements will entice non-individual investors (call them 
tax-exempts) to hold more dividend stocks and less no-dividend stocks.  As a result, each 
investor ultimately would hold the portfolio that features his optimal tradeoff between risk and 
after-tax return; the share price of each stock would equate supply and demand; and a 
heterogeneous mix of shareholders would emerge endogenously.  One example of an empirical 
study of such tax clientele responses is Dhaliwal, et al. (1999), who document increases in 
institutional holdings when firms initiate dividends, which are tax-disadvantaged to individual 
investors.
 8   
Similarly, if individuals were taxed more heavily on dividends than on share repurchases, 
then they would overweight their portfolios with stocks that distributed disproportionate amounts 
of profits through repurchases, as compared with dividends.
9  Meanwhile, non-individual 
investors would overweight their portfolios with stocks that distributed disproportionate amounts 
                                                           
7 We appreciate the contributions of an anonymous referee in sketching out the framework that we rely on in this 
paper. 
8 Moser and Puckett (2009) include the JGTRRA in their study of whether there is a positive association between the 
portion of dividend-paying securities in tax-advantaged institutions’ portfolios and the dividend penalty.  Although 
they find evidence of a positive association, their analysis is confounded by the inclusion of financial institutions as 
tax-advantaged institutions (Blouin 2009).  
9 We are assuming that tax-sensitive investors do not interpret any potential dividend and repurchase signals 
differently from other market participants. 7 
 
of profits through dividends, as compared with share repurchases.  In this setting, managers 
would choose both the level and mix (dividends versus share repurchases) of shareholder 
distributions that maximizes the firm’s stock price.  Their distribution policy would affect both 
the equilibrium price and the equilibrium mix of investors and changes in their payout policy 
will induce a change in the mix of investors that own the firm. 
Now suppose the dividend tax rate was cut.  Individual investors would rebalance their 
portfolios, adding more dividend-paying stocks than was optimal under the prior high-dividend 
tax regime.  This will drive up the price of dividend-paying stocks, altering the optimal portfolio 
mix for tax-exempt investors who would now shift from dividend-paying stocks to no-dividend 
stocks at the margin.  At the same time that investors would be adjusting their portfolios in light 
of the changes in dividend tax policy, managers would be revising their level and mix of 
shareholder distributions in light of the new tax policy to continue to maximize their stock price.  
As a result, both the investor mix (individuals versus tax-exempts) and the firm’s distribution 
policy (dividends versus share repurchases) would change after a reduction in the dividend tax 
rate.   
To determine the relative importance of the investor response and the firm’s response 
would require joint evaluation of both investors’ and managers’ incentives.  Studies that examine 
only individual investors’ new tax-motivated demand for dividends might erroneously attribute 
all of the increase in dividends to a clientele effect.  In the extreme, this is true even if investors 
did not rebalance their portfolio but rather, firms simply increased their dividend payouts.  
Likewise, studies (such as several prior examinations of JGTRRA) that focused solely on firm’s 
new tax-driven supply of dividends might erroneously attribute increased dividend income by 
individuals to a payout response when the result was actually due to individual investors 8 
 
rebalancing their portfolios.  In the tests below, we find evidence of both a clientele and a 
managerial response to shareholder tax rate reductions.     
 
Investor Responses 
We begin our hypothesis development by focusing on potential investor responses to 
JGTRRA.  We assume that because the decline in the dividend tax rate (from 38.6% to 15%) 
exceeded the decrease in the capital gains tax rate (from 20% to 15%) that the net effect of 
JGTRRA was to make firms that distributed profits mostly through dividends more attractive for 
individual investors than those that distribute profits mostly through share repurchases.  
Assuming investors were holding the optimal portfolio (considering risk and taxes) before 
JGTRRA’s enactment, we predict that, after enactment, individual investors altered their 
portfolios to receive a higher percentage of their returns in the form of dividends.   
H1: Individual investors responded to JGTRRA by increasing their holdings in 
stocks that distribute larger proportions of their profits through dividends.   
 
That said, it is important to recognize that investors cannot freely rebalance their 
portfolios.  Besides commissions and other transaction costs that investors face on all trades, 
taxable investors pay capital gains taxes on any excess of the proceeds from the sale of the stock 
over the basis of the stock.  Thus, some investors may have accepted an inferior portfolio, rather 
than incur the tax and non-tax costs of rebalancing their portfolio.  This is one reason why we 




Meanwhile, we anticipate that firms will respond to individual investors’ enhanced 
interest in dividends by increasing the portion of profits that they distribute in the form of 
dividends.  Those firms wishing to retain or increase their holdings by individual investors are 
likely to distribute more of their profits as dividends, following enactment, than other firms.  
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the pool of future shareholders that firms hope to attract by 
adjusting their payout policy.  Therefore, we look to their shareholder mix at passage and assume 
that firms with larger individual owners at enactment would be more likely to alter their 
distribution policy to distribute more of their profits as dividends than those firms with little, if 
any, individual ownership.  To the extent a firm’s current investor mix is not a good predictor of 
managers’ desired investor mix in the future, our tests are biased against finding a firm response 
to JGTRRA.   
H2: Managers responded to JGTRRA by distributing a larger portion of their 
profits as dividends.  The extent to which managers increased their dividend 
percentage increased with the individual ownership of their firm.   
 
That said, there are several reasons why managers might not have adjusted their 
dividend-repurchase mix in response to JGTRRA.  First, the JGTRRA tax rate reductions were 
scheduled to expire in five years at the end of 2008 (later deferred to the end of 2010) and 2004 
Democratic Presidential candidate, John Kerry, pledged to restore the higher dividend tax rates 
for the two highest tax brackets, if elected.  Since dividends tend to be sticky and the markets 
historically punish firms for decreasing dividends, many firms may have chosen to leave their 
distribution policy unchanged, delay any change until after the 2004 elections, or turn to one-
time special dividends (which we ignore in this study).  Second, dividends are purported to play 10 
 
an important role by alleviating asymmetric information through conveying private information 
to the market.  Tax-motivated dividend changes might undermine this signal.  Three, large 
increases in dividends could adversely affect the firm’s compensation structure, particularly to 
the extent that the firm relies on stock options, which are not dividend-protected.  Consistent 
with this deterrent to modifying distributions, Aboody and Kasnick (2008) find that firms that 
increased their dividends after JGTRRA modified their stock option and restricted stock 
compensation plans.  In short, there were multiple reasons for firms to be hesitant about 
modifying their distribution policy following JGTRRA, even if individuals were seeking higher 
dividends than before the legislation.     
 
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
System of Regression Equations 
As discussed above, we jointly evaluate the changes in investor composition and 
distribution policy following enactment of JGTRRA.  We predict that individual investors 
rebalanced their portfolios so that a larger proportion of their shareholder income was in the form 
of dividends as opposed to share repurchases.  We also expect that managers altered their 
distributions so that a larger proportion of their distributions were dividends and that this 
adjustment was increasing in the extent to which individuals owned the firm.  
  To jointly evaluate the impact of investor and manager responses to JGTRRA, we 
estimate a system of four equations (variables are defined below):  
Equation (1): INSIDER = α0 + α1*POST + α2*DIV% + α3*DIV%*POST + α4*S&PRATING + 
α5*AGE + α6*SP500 + α7*LIQUIDITY + α8*BETA + α9*IRISK + 
α10*MKTADJRET + α11*SALESGR + α12*R&DINT 
 11 
 
Equation (2): NONEXEC = δ0 + δ1*POST + δ2*DIV% + δ3*DIV%*POST + δ4*S&PRATING + 
δ5*AGE + δ6*SP500 + δ7*LIQUIDITY + δ8*BETA + δ9*IRISK + 
δ10*MKTADJRET + δ11*SALESGR + δ12*R&DINT 
 
Equation (3): MF = γ0 + γ1*POST + γ2*DIV% + γ3*DIV%*POST + γ4*S&PRATING + γ5*AGE 
+ γ6*SP500 + γ7*LIQUIDITY + γ8*BETA + γ9*IRISK + γ10*MKTADJRET + 
γ11*SALESGR + γ12*R&DINT 
 
Equation (4): DIV% = β0 + β1*POST + β2*INSIDER + β3*INSIDER*POST + β4*NONEXEC + 
β5*NONEXEC*POST + β6*MF + β7*MF*POST + β8*RE + β9*PERM + 
β10*TRANS + β11*FCF + β12*DYIELD + β13*LEVERAGE + β14*SIZE + Industry 
Dummies 
 
To capture investor responses, the first three equations regress the percentage of the firm held by 
three individual investor groups on the percentage of the firm’s payouts that are dividends 
(DIV%).  There is one equation for each investor group: insiders (INSIDER in equation 1), other 
individuals (NONEXEC in equation 2), and mutual funds (MF in equation 3).  The coefficients 
on the key variables of interest are α3, δ3, and γ3, respectively.  The fourth and final equation in 
the system flips the direction of the association and regresses the percentage of the firm’s 
payouts that are dividends on each of the three-investor groups.  The fourth equation has three 
key variables of interest, one for each investor group in the period post-enactment: insiders (β3), 
other individuals (β5), and mutual funds (β7).   
 
Dividends-to-Payout Ratio Variable 
  The percentage of the firm’s payouts that are dividends (DIV%) is an explanatory 
variable in the first three equations and the dependent variable in the final equation.  DIV% is a 
ratio where the numerator is the sum of dividends over an eight-quarter period.  The denominator 
is the sum of dividends and share repurchases over the same eight quarters.  There are two eight-
quarter periods for each firm.  The first eight quarters are the eight quarters immediately before 12 
 
the fiscal quarter in which JGTRRA was enacted.
10  The second eight quarters are the eight 
quarters immediately following the fiscal quarter in which the JGTRRA was enacted.
11  
Consequently, each firm has two DIV% measures—one before enactment and one after 
enactment.   
  We aggregate distributions over a two-year period because, unlike regular, quarterly 
dividends, share repurchases are irregular.  Therefore, focusing on the dividend-repurchase mix 
in a single quarter could introduce excessive noise.  That said, in sensitivity tests later in the 
paper, we relax this aggregation requirement and report results on a quarterly basis.  Inferences 
are largely unaltered. 
We can measure repurchases in two ways.  One option is total share repurchases.  
Another option is net repurchases, i.e., total share repurchases less stock issuances.
12  We use net 
repurchases because we are interested in the cash that the firm could have distributed as 
dividends.  Fama and French (2001) note that dividends cannot substitute for repurchases in 
many situations.  Firms need shares for executive compensation, stock option exercises, stock 
acquisitions, and funding employee stock ownership plans, among other things.  Thus, consistent 
with Fama and French (2001), we measure net repurchases as the change in treasury stock.
13  If 
there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then we truncate our measure of repurchases at zero.  
                                                           
10 We exclude the enactment quarter (May 2003) because it is unclear which tax regime managers were 
contemplating when they issued dividends and repurchased shares during that quarter.  We treat the first quarter of 
2003 as a pre-enactment quarter, even though the legislation was retroactive to the beginning of the year.  The 
reason is that passage of the legislation was uncertain until Vice-President Cheney’s tiebreaking vote in the U.S. 
Senate in May.  Sensitivity tests, detailed below, provide assurance that this classification is appropriate.  In 
addition, inferences hold if we exclude any 2003 quarters from the pre-enactment period.   
11 Blouin and Krull (2009) show that share repurchases rose in 2005 as firms enjoyed a tax holiday for repatriating 
earnings from foreign subsidiaries.  When we replicate our analysis excluding the 2005 quarters, inferences hold.   
12 For further detail, see the discussion in footnotes 5 and 6 of Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson and Roberts (2007) 
and footnote 9 of Skinner (2007). 
13 Using treasury stock to measure repurchases is not without limitations.  As Fama and French (2001) point out, 
using annual changes in treasury stock will fail to match a repurchase in one year and its reissuance in another year.  
This problem is mitigated in our research design because we combine two years of activity into one observation.  
However, even aggregation over two years cannot fully eliminate the potential mismeasurement. 13 
 
For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we measure net repurchases as total 
repurchases from the statement of cash flows less decreases in preferred stock. 
For post-enactment observations in the first three regressions, we interact DIV% with 
POST, a categorical variable that equals one for observations after the May 23, 2003 enactment 
(i.e., quarters after the second quarter of 2003).  In these three tax clientele tests, positive 
coefficients on DIV%*POST (the coefficients are α3, δ3, and γ3 in the system of equations) will 
be interpreted as evidence that, after passage of the JGTRRA, individuals rebalanced their 
portfolios by shifting toward stocks where dividends constituted a larger portion of total payouts.  
We also include POST as a separate variable in each regression equation to capture any other 
temporal change.   
 
Investor Group Variables 
We employ three variables to capture the portion of the firm owned by individual 
investors.  The first individual ownership measure, INSIDER, is the percentage of shares held by 
directors and officers as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.
14  Note that these 
shareholders play dual roles—as the managers setting distribution policy and as individual 
shareholders, often with large stockholdings and suffering from inadequate diversification.
15   
The second measure of individual ownership is NONEXEC, which is intended to measure 
all individual holdings, other than those by insiders or through mutual funds.  Ideally, we would 
                                                           
14 The reporting of holdings of insiders is mandated by Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which 
applies to every person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of equity security registered 
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act and each director and officer (collectively, "reporting persons" or "insiders") 
of the issuer of the security.  On a different note, conclusions do not change if we limit INSIDER to direct holdings, 
excluding shares held by family members, trusts and corporations controlled by the insider, and similar related 
parties. 
15 Brown, et al. (2007) report that insiders were particularly influential among dividend initiators in 2003.  They 
present evidence consistent with dividends crowding out repurchases in firms with large insider holdings.  However, 
they find no such substitution or insider influence among companies that were paying dividends before JGTRRA, 
which is the group of firms that is the focus of this paper’s analysis. 14 
 
measure the number of shares for which dividends and capital gains are expected to flow through 
to individual tax returns, i.e., those shares held by individuals or flow-through entities (e.g., 
mutual funds, partnerships, trusts, S corporations, or limited liability corporations) whose income 
is reported on U.S. individual tax returns.  This ideal measure would exclude all other holdings, 
i.e.,  those shares for which the dividends and capital gains do not flow through to individual tax 
returns, such as tax-exempt organizations, corporations, foreigners, and tax-deferred accounts 
(e.g., qualified retirement plans, including pensions, 401(k), and IRAs).  Unfortunately, the ideal 
measure does not exist.  Thus, as Ayers et al. (2002), Ayers et al. (2003), Blouin et al. (2003), 
Dhaliwal et al. (2003), and many others do, we use 13-F filings to estimate the percentage of the 
firm held by individual shareholders.  NONEXEC is one less (a) the percentage of shares that 
institutional investors own, as reported in 13-F filings and collected by Thomson Financial’s 
Institutional Holdings database, (b) the percentage of shares held by non-officer/director 
beneficial owners as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing data, and (c) INSIDER. 
The third measure of individual ownership, MF, is the percentage of the firm owned by 
mutual funds, as reported in 13-F filings and collected by Thomson Financial’s Institutional 
Holdings database.  As mentioned above, this is an imperfect measure of individual ownership 
because mutual funds include both investments that are subject to personal taxes and investments 
that are not subject to personal taxes.  Sometimes the dividends and capital gains realized by 
mutual funds are taxed at the individual level.  At other times, distributions to mutual funds are 
exempt because the shares are held in deferred tax accounts, such as 401(k) or IRAs.  We include 
MF in the study as an attempt to capture all shareholder income that is taxed on personal tax 
returns.  However, we recognize that the unobservable measurement error in MF (arising from 
the inclusion of non-individual owners) may undermine its usefulness in the study.   15 
 
Each of the three individual ownership measures serves as the dependent variable in one 
of the first three regressions.  All three are explanatory variables in the fourth regression, which 
tests for firm responses.  Positive coefficients on these variables will be consistent with firms’ 
altering their payouts in response to changes in individual tax incentives.  Specifically, a positive 
coefficient on INSIDER*POST (β3) in the fourth regression will be interpreted as evidence that, 
after passage of the JGTRRA, the percentage of payouts distributed as dividends was increasing 
in insider ownership.  It seems likely, that when directors and officers hold large shares of a firm, 
payouts are likely to be particularly responsive to individual tax incentives.  A positive 
coefficient on NONEXEC*POST (β5) in the fourth regression will be interpreted as evidence that, 
after passage, DIV% was increasing in the percentage of the firm held by non-executive 
shareholders.  A positive coefficient on MF*POST (β7) in the fourth regression will be 
interpreted as evidence that, after passage, DIV% was increasing in the percentage of the firm 
held by mutual funds.  The measurement error in MF (arising from the fact that non-individuals 
invest in mutual funds) should bias the coefficient on MF*POST toward zero. 
 
Control variables 
Theory is not sufficiently rich to provide much guidance concerning the control variables 
in a system of equations where the dependent variables are investor composition and the mix of 
dividends and repurchases.  To our knowledge, no paper models the non-tax variables that 
should vary with the dependent variables in this study.  Thus, we control for a host of factors that 
have been found to be associated with the investor mix and the distribution mix. 
For the three regression equations testing for clientele effects, we rely on Bushee (2001), 
who shows that the level of institutional ownership is associated with firm value, and Del 16 
 
Guercio (1996), who documents that institutional holders tend to hold investments that are more 
prudent.  Hence, we include a number of control variables in the investor holdings regressions to 
capture firm value and the relative quality of the investment.  Specifically, we include SALESGR 
as a proxy for firm growth.  It is defined as the average sales growth over the three previous 
years.  We include two proxies for firm risk: beta (BETA), which is included to control for 
systematic risk and the standard deviation of the prior year’s daily market model residuals 
(IRISK) to control for idiosyncratic risk.  Market-adjusted returns over the prior year 
(MKTADJRET) is intended to control for firm performance, which has been found to be 
positively associated with institutional holdings.  The S&P common stock rating (S&PRATING) 
and the number of years that the firm is covered by CRSP (AGE) are included to capture the 
relative quality of the underlying investment.  The prior year’s log of average monthly volume 
divided by shares outstanding (LIQUIDITY) is included as a control for liquidity because 
institutional holders prefer more liquid securities.  We also include whether or not a firm is listed 
on the S&P 500 (SP500) as a control because many index funds are required to hold these firms. 
 Finally, we include R&D intensity (R&DINT), measured as research and development expenses 
divided by sales because Hessel and Norman (1992) report that some institutions are fixated on 
the R&D activity of the firm. 
Concerning the fourth regression, where the dependent variable is DIV%, we take the 
approach of including various measures that are known to affect either dividends or repurchases, 
though sensitivity tests show that results are largely robust to the set of control variables.  First, 
we include lagged retained earnings scaled by lagged total assets (RE) in the model.  A firm must 
have earnings and profits (as defined in the tax law) for its distributions to be taxed as dividends.  
Unfortunately, earnings and profits are unobservable, found only in confidential corporate tax 17 
 
returns.  Thus, we use retained earnings as a proxy for earnings and profits.  If firms with low or 
no retained earnings have fewer distributions that qualify as dividends, then DIV% should 
increase in RE.  Consistent with this expectation and liquidity constraints, DeAngelo et al. (2005) 
report that firms with low or no retained earnings pay fewer dividends.  Next, we include 
earnings in the model.  Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) report that 
dividends are paid from permanent earnings whereas repurchases are paid from transitory 
earnings.  Dittmar and Dittmar (2004) contend that both are paid from permanent earnings, but 
agree that repurchases come from transitory earnings.  Thus, we dichotomize earnings into a 
permanent part (PERM) and a transitory part (TRANS).  We measure PERM with operating 
income and TRANS as the difference between net income and operating income.
16  We scale both 
components by lagged assets.  Based on the conflicts in the prior work, we make no prediction 
about the sign of PERM.  However, we expect DIV% should decrease in TRANS.  We also 
include a measure of the firm’s payout capacity, free cash flow scaled by lagged assets (FCF).  
Dividends may be a mechanism to reduce agency problems in firms with free cash flow (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  Thus, we anticipate that DIV% is increasing in FCF.  We include the 
lagged ratio of dividends to the market value of equity (DYIELD), expecting DIV% to be 
increasing in the DYIELD.  We add lagged long-term debt, scaled by lagged assets, 
(LEVERAGE) to control for cross-firm variation in capital structure.  Finally, we include the 
natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to control for any size effects.  We have no expectations 
about the sign of the LEVERAGE and SIZE coefficients. 
 
                                                           
16 Differences between permanent and transitory earnings include special items, other income and discontinued 
operations. 18 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL TESTS 
Sample Selection 
  We begin our tests for investor and manager responses following JGTRRA by drawing 
an initial sample from the 14,122 firms in the Compustat database between the second quarter of 
2001 and the quarter preceding the one that includes May 2003.  We then exclude (a) firms 
whose shares were not common or publicly traded, (b) firms that changed their fiscal year-end 
during our sample period, (c) financial institutions and insurance companies since regulatory 
constraints may inhibit management from altering the firm’s payout policy, (d) firms with 
missing Compustat information, and (e) firms not in existence at any time from July 1, 2001, to 
June 30, 2005.   
  From the remaining 1,923 firms, we draw two balanced panels.  Each firm must have one 
observation for the eight quarters preceding JGTRRA and one observation for the eight quarters 
following JGTRRA.  Because DIV% is undefined if there is neither a dividend nor a repurchase, 
each firm must have at least one dividend or one repurchase, both before and after JGTRRA.  
The first sample (Dividend Payers Sample) is the 421 firms in the study that paid dividends 
sometime during the eight quarters immediately preceding JGTRRA and had either a dividend or 
repurchase (or both) during the eight quarters immediately following JGTRRA.  The second 
sample (Dividend Payers and Repurchasers) is the 294 firms that both paid dividends and 
repurchased shares sometime during the eight quarters immediately preceding JGTRRA and had 
either a dividend or a repurchase (or both) during the eight quarters immediately following 
JGTRRA. 
  Our definition of DIV% forces us to exclude firms that distribute no profits to 
shareholders.  We further chose to limit our tests to firms that paid dividends at least once during 19 
 
the eight quarters preceding JGTRRA.  The reason for these limitations is two-fold.  First, firms 
that were paying dividends before passage paid 97% of the dividends issued in the four quarters 
following enactment.  However, much of the JGTRRA research (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2005 and 
Brown, et al., 2007) has focused on the relatively narrow impact of JGTRRA on dividend 
initiation in 2003 alone.
17  Thus, this paper chooses to focus on the under-studied, but more 
economically significant, portion of the economy, the dividend-paying firms.  Second, dividend 
initiation, and to a lesser extent, a firm’s first share repurchase, convey more and different 
information to the markets than simply altering the amount of an ongoing stream of dividends or 
repurchases.  Thus, firms that have a history of shareholder distributions likely can modify the 
dividend-repurchase mix at a lower cost than firms that have never paid dividends or repurchased 
shares.  In fact, it is possible that some managers that had never paid dividends before JGTRRA 
considered initiating payouts in response to the changed tax incentives associated with JGTRRA 
but decided that the costs of initiation exceeded the benefits of attracting individual investors 
who were now seeking more dividend income.  By limiting our analysis to dividend-paying 
firms, we ensure that the potential costs of dividend initiation do not affect our estimates of 
managerial responsiveness to the changed individual tax incentives under JGTRRA.  This both 
increases the power of our tests and removes an additional factor that we would need to control 
for, if we included non-dividend-paying firms.  One downside to limiting the sample to firms 
that were already paying dividends is that, if these firms were at their dividend capacity when 
JGTRRA was enacted, then they may have been unable to increase their dividend payouts, even 
if they had wished to respond to the changed tax incentives for individual investors.  
                                                           
17 This is not to imply that initiations arising from the JGTRRA were unimportant.  Initiators began issuing 
dividends that they might not have paid and likely will continue to issue dividends in the future because dividend 
payments are sticky and the market takes a dim view of dividend cuts.   20 
 
  Another distinguishing factor about our analysis of JGTRRA is that we examine investor 
and firm responses through 2005.  Desai and Dharmapala (2010) study portfolio rebalancing in 
2003 only.  Brown et al. (2007) and Aboody and Kasznick (2008) study changes in the dividend-
repurchase mix for only two quarters after passage of the legislation.  As Shevlin (2008) notes, 
examining such a short period requires quick response by firms and raises concerns about 
whether these studies miss important responses in 2004 and 2005.  It seems unlikely that during 
the seven months following enactment investors completely unwound their positions and firms 
had fully adjusted their notoriously sticky dividends and repurchase policy in response to the tax 
rate reductions.  By investigating a longer window, we permit a more deliberate response and 
can calibrate how long it took for the largest dividend tax rate reduction in history to fully 
permeate the economy. 
  Although we exclude non-dividend-paying firms from the primary tests in this paper, in 
the process of selecting the sample firms, we detect some initial evidence consistent with firms 
shifting from repurchases to dividends.  Among the 1,923 firms from which we draw our 
samples, we find that 145 companies initiated dividends after JGTRRA, while only 30 firms 
omitted dividends (a net increase of 115 dividend issuers).  Meanwhile, 222 firms began 
repurchasing after enactment while 370 companies stopped repurchasing (a net reduction of 148 
repurchasers).  We also find that 26 firms both initiated dividends and ceased repurchasing after 
passage of the JGTRRA, while only three firms omitted dividends and began repurchasing.  
Furthermore, among 702 firms that repurchased both before and after JGTRRA, 90 initiated 
dividends while only ten firms omitted dividends, a net increase in dividend issuers of 80 firms.  
On the other hand, among the 408 firms that paid dividends both before and after JGTRRA, 46 
began repurchasing after passage, but 58 stopped buying back shares, a net decrease in 21 
 
repurchasers of 12 firms.  All of these comparisons are consistent with firms’ shifting from 
repurchases to dividends following enactment of the JGTRRA. 
 
Descriptive statistics  
  Table 1 provides means and medians for the regression variables, both before and after 
enactment of JGTRRA, for both samples and reports whether the pre- and post-enactment means 
and medians are significantly different.
18  The samples provide some evidence that dividends 
increased following JGTRRA (median total dividends and mean dividends per assets increased 
in both samples).  However, there is less evidence that DIV% (i.e., dividends as a percentage of 
total shareholder distributions) increased after passage (only the difference in medians for the 
Dividend Payers and Repurchasers sample is significant).  Recall, however, that we do not 
hypothesize about the overall impact of JGTRRA on dividends, repurchases or DIV%.  Rather, 
we are predicting a more positive association between DIV% and individual stock ownership, 
following passage of JGTRRA.   
  Both samples show decreases in non-executive individual holdings (NONEXEC) and 
increases in mutual funds holdings (MF).
19  Among control variables, free cash flow (FCF), 
volume (LIQUIDITY), idiosyncratic risk (IRISK), and returns (MKTADJRET) fell after 
enactment for both samples.  Stock ratings (S&PRATING), beta (BETA), and sales growth 
(SALESGR) increased after passage for both samples.   
 
                                                           
18 Means are tested using a t-test of the means.  The p-values for the medians are the larger p-value using the 
Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Willis tests. 
19 According to the Investment Company Institute (see www.ICI.org), from 2001 to 2005 mutual fund ownership of 
all publicly traded equity securities increased from 21% to 25%.  In addition, over our sample period, individuals 
increased the proportion of their financial assets held by mutual funds from 40% in 2001 to 47% in 2005. 22 
 
Preliminary Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the primary findings in the study, summary statistics from GMM 
estimates of the system of four equations.  To provide some perspective for those results, Tables 
2 and 3 show separate OLS regression results for each of the four equations.  Table 2 shows 
selected coefficient estimates from the first three equations where investor ownership 
percentages are the dependent variables and DIV%*POST is the variable of interest.  Table 3 
presents results for the fourth equation where DIV% is the dependent variable and the ownership 
percentages of the three-investor groups are explanatory variables.   
Starting with Table 2, we expect a positive coefficient on DIV%*POST, which will be 
interpreted as evidence that, following enactment, individual ownership increased for those firms 
that distributed larger portions of their profits as dividends.  Using OLS, we find a positive 
coefficient on DIV%*POST (α3) when INSIDER is the dependent variable.  However, the 
coefficient is not significantly greater than zero at the 5% level (using a one-tailed test, the 
coefficient is significant at the 10% level for the Dividend Payers sample).  Contrary to 
expectations, three of the four coefficients on DIV%*POST are negative when the dependent 
variable is NONEXEC (δ3) or MF (γ3), although none is significantly different from zero.  In 
short, the OLS results in Table 2 provide no evidence that investors rebalanced their portfolios 
following enactment, shifting toward stocks that distributed a larger portion of their payout as 
dividends.   
Among the control variables, two are significant in every regression.  LIQUIDITY is 
negative when INSIDER or NONEXEC is the dependent variable and positive when MF is the 
dependent variable.  The signs flip for IRISK, i.e., its coefficient is always positive when 
INSIDER or NONEXEC is the dependent variable and always negative when MF is the 23 
 
dependent variable.  These results are consistent with differences in the non-tax factors that 
matter to insiders and non-executive individuals investing on their own account as compared to 
those that matter to mutual fund investors (see Bushee 2001).     
Table 3 presents OLS summary statistics from regressing the ratio of dividends to total 
payouts (DIV%) on the measures of individual ownership and control variables.  We predict that 
the coefficients on INSIDER*POST (β3), NONEXEC*POST (β5), and MF*POST (β7) will be 
positive, consistent with firms altering their distribution policy to retain and attract individual 
investors, given the tax changes in JGTRRA. 
We find the INSIDER*POST coefficients are positive and significantly greater than zero 
at the 5% level.  We interpret these findings as evidence that firms with large holdings by 
directors and officers distributed a larger portion of their profits as dividends, after enactment, 
than they did before enactment.  This is consistent with the individuals who set the 
dividend/repurchase policy (i.e., the directors and officers), modifying the distribution policy 
after enactment in a manner that is consistent with their own (and other individual) shareholders’ 
interests.  The NONEXEC*POST and MF*POST coefficients also are positive, but not 
significantly greater than zero at conventional levels.
20  These initial results are consistent with 
managers responding to the altered tax incentives of directors and officers, but not other 
individual investors. 
Among control variables, the coefficients on RE (retained earnings) are always 
significantly greater than zero.  The coefficients on PERM (operating income), FCF (free cash 
flow), and SIZE (total assets) are always significantly less than zero.   
 
                                                           
20 The NONEXEC*POST coefficient is significant at the 10% level using a one-tailed test in the in the Dividend 
Payers and Repurchasers sample.  24 
 
Primary Regression Results 
We now estimate all four-regression equations simultaneously.  We find that coefficients 
estimates are larger and more significant using simultaneous estimation procedures, consistent 
with joint evaluation of investor and firm responses leading to superior estimates than were 
detected using separate estimations.  We infer from the stronger results that investor and 
managers responded concurrently to the tax changes in JGTRRA.   
Table 4 shows the results from estimating all four equations simultaneously using GMM.  
For brevity, we report only the coefficients for the key variables.  Looking first at insider 
responses, we find that, when INSIDER is the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
DIV%*POST (α3) is significantly greater than zero for the Dividend Payers sample at the 5% 
level.  (It is significant at the 10% level using the Dividend Payers and Repurchasers sample.)  
This finding is consistent with directors and officers boosting their holdings in their own firms, 
after enactment, if their firms were distributing relatively large portions of their profits as 
dividends (i.e., it is consistent with a tax clientele effect).
21  The DIV%*POST coefficient of 0.11 
implies that an increase of one standard deviation in DIV%*POST or 0.28, would boost insider 
holdings by three percentage points.  This is a substantial increase in holdings by directors and 
officers because they held only 10% of the firm, on average, before JGTRRA.  In contrast, as in 
Table 2, we continue to find no evidence that non-executive individuals (δ3) or mutual fund 
investors (γ3) rebalanced their holdings by shifting toward firms distributing a higher portion of 
their profits as dividends, as compared with repurchases.  Thus, we conclude that directors and 
                                                           
21 Since the percentage of stock held by insiders was declining during the investigation period (see Table 1), insiders 
in high-dividend-paying firms may not have been buying far more shares in their own companies.  Instead, perhaps 
these insiders simply sold few shares in their own companies during this period while insiders in lower dividend-
paying firms were unloading large holdings. 25 
 
officers were the only investor group changing their holdings in response to firm distribution 
policy. 
Looking at manager responses, we find strong evidence that firms held disproportionately 
by insiders, non-executive individuals, and mutual funds began to distribute a higher percentage 
of profits through dividends following enactment.  When the dependent variable is DIV%, the 
coefficients on INSIDER*POST (β3), NONEXEC*POST (β5) and MF*POST (β7) are all positive 
and significant at conventional levels for both samples.  These results are consistent with 
managers modifying their payout policy in response to their individual owners’ increased 
preference for dividends compared with repurchases, following passage of JGTRRA.  In other 
words, as dividends became less tax-disadvantaged, firms appear to have provided more 
dividends as a percentage of their total payout.  Brown, et al (2007) reports similar findings but 
only for insiders with large holdings in firms that initiated dividend in 2003.
22  Our findings 
show that firm responses extended to a broader set of firms (non-initiating dividend payers) and 
individual investors.        
Analyzing the economic significance of each coefficient using a one-standard deviation 
increase, we find that the INSIDER*POST coefficient of 0.32 (0.42) with the Dividend Payers 
(Dividend Payers & Repurchasers) sample implies a four (six) percentage point increase in 
DIV%, i.e., the percentage of payout, distributed as dividends.  With a pre-JGTRRA mean DIV% 
of 78% (68%), this suggests that for every standard deviation increase in insider holdings, the 
ratio of dividend issuance to total distributions rose 5% (9%).  Likewise, the NONEXEC*POST 
coefficient suggests a four percentage point increase in DIV% for both samples.  Finally, the 
MF*POST coefficient of 0.28 (0.33) implies a four (five) percentage point increase in DIV% for 
                                                           
22 Brown, et al (2007) treats all 2003 dividend initiations as responses to JGTRRA, even though the legislation was 
highly controversial and passed by a single vote in the U.S. Senate in May. 26 
 
the Dividend Payers (Dividend Payers & Repurchasers) sample.  In short, all six coefficients 
across the two samples imply an economically significant change in distribution policy in 
response to altered investor preferences following JGTRRA. 
We find that the GMM estimates are substantially stronger than the OLS ones.  This is 
consistent with our expectation that investor and manager responses are simultaneously 
determined.  Evaluating only investors or only managers potentially explains some of the weak 
and conflicting results from prior JGTRRA studies (see reviews by Dharmapala, 2009, and 
Shackelford, 2009).  In this analysis, if we were to stop with the OLS results, we would 
erroneously conclude that no investors rebalanced their portfolios and that the firm responses 
were limited to those companies with heavy insider ownership.  We also would substantially 
understate the economic significance of legislation as estimated by using the regression 
coefficients.   
 
Comparisons with Non-Event Periods 
This section repeats the analyses detailed above using non-event periods.  If the 2003 
findings are related to JGTRRA, then we expect the coefficients from the non-event years to be 
different from the 2003 coefficients.  We repeat the tests as if the actual May, 2003 rate 
reductions had occurred in May, 1994, and include the eight pseudo “pre-enactment” quarters 
prior to the quarter that includes May, 1994 and the eight pseudo “post-enactment” quarters that 
follow the quarter that includes May, 1994.  We then repeat this seven more times, using May of 
each year as the pseudo event.
23   
                                                           
23 We stop with 2001 because any test of 2002 would result in the inclusion of some of the period following 
enactment of the JGTRRA, invalidating its use as a non-event, comparison period. 27 
 
Table 5 reports the GMM summary statistics for the key coefficients for each year for the 
Dividend Payers sample.
24  For example, estimating Equation (1) for 1994, where INSIDER is 
the dependent variable, the DIV%*POST coefficient is -0.04.  With Equation (2), when 
NONEXEC is the dependent variable, the DIV%*POST coefficient is 0.23.  With Equation (3), 
when MF is the dependent variable, the DIV%*POST coefficient is 0.01.  With Equation (4), for 
the single firm response equation where the dependent variable is DIV%, the INSIDER*POST 
coefficient is 0.15; the NONEXEC*POST coefficient is 0.03; and the MF*POST coefficient is 
0.02.  Unlike the 2003 results where four of the six coefficients are significantly greater than 
zero, none of these six coefficients is significantly different from zero.  However, at the same 
time, none of the 1994 coefficients is significantly different from its 2003 counterpart, 
suggesting that there may be nothing unique about 2003.  Results for the remaining years are 
tabulated, and summary statistics for the coefficients from the non-event years are presented at 
the bottom of Table 5.   
The findings confirm the inferences drawn from the primary tests in Table 4.  The 2003 
coefficient on DIV%*POST, when INSIDER is the dependent variable, exceeds its counterpart in 
every year, except 2001.  Using a t-test (sign test), we can reject at the 0.02 (0.07) level that the 
2003 coefficient would be randomly selected from a distribution formed by the eight coefficients 
from 1994 through 2001.  Finding that the 2003 association was different provides further 
confirmation that insider holdings, following JGTRRA, were increasing in the dividend 
percentage of total payout.  As further confirmation of the Table 4 results, we continue to find no 
indication of tax clientele movements by other individuals or mutual funds.   
Turning to the manager responses to JGTRRA, we find that the 2003 INSIDER*POST 
coefficient always exceeds its counterparts in every year from 1994 to 2001 and significantly so 
                                                           
24 Inferences are qualitatively unaltered if the Dividend Payers and Repurchasers sample is used. 28 
 
from 1997 to 2000.  The 2003 NONEXEC*POST coefficient is greater than its counterparts in 
every year, except 1996, and statistically significantly larger in two of the eight years.  The 2003 
MF*POST coefficient always exceeds its non-event counterparts, though not significantly.  
However, for all three 2003 coefficients, we can reject at the 1% level, using a t-test, that the 
2003 coefficient would be randomly drawn from a distribution of the estimated coefficients from 
the non-event years.  We can similarly reject at the 1% (7%) level, using the sign test, for the 
INSIDER*POST and MF*POST (NONEXEC*POST) coefficients.  Together, these results 
support our earlier conclusions that managers of firms with disproportionately large individual 
investor holdings modified their distribution policy more than other firms did.  These sensitivity 
tests provide comfort about our earlier inferences, providing evidence that the associations in 
2003 between distribution policy and individual ownership measures differ from the relations 
between those variables in the prior decade. 
There is a caveat for this robustness check.  The capital gains tax rate fell from 28% to 
20% in 1997 without any change in the dividend tax rate.  Using the same logic developed in this 
study, we would have predicted a shift from dividends to repurchases following that rate 
reduction, albeit of a lesser extent because the rate change was more modest.  If that change in 
the distribution mix did occur, then this sensitivity test using non-event periods would bias in 
favor of our finding that the 2003 coefficients were more positive than those in previous years.  
The reason is that the tax incentives facing individual investors after the rate reductions in 1997 
would have called for the mix of distributions to shift toward repurchases and away from 
dividends.  In other words, 1997 was not really a non-event year.   
Therefore, if firms responded accordingly, we would expect the coefficients on the 
individual tax measures for 1997 and perhaps 1998 to be negative.  Consistent with firms 29 
 
modifying their payout policy if individuals held disproportionately large interests, we notice 
that that the coefficients on INSIDER*POST, NONEXEC*POST, and MF*POST coefficients 
(when DIV% is the dependent variable) turn negative for the first time in 1997.  Thus, firm 
responses to changing tax incentives following the 1997 Act may have biased in favor of our 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the distribution mix did not change after 2003.  However, when 
we exclude the 1997 coefficients in our comparison of the 2003 coefficients to those in the other 
non-event periods, we still find that the 2003 coefficient estimate remains significantly different 
from those in the other years.  Furthermore, if managers did indeed respond to the 1997 tax cuts 
by increasing the repurchase portion of their distributions, then these results provide further 
evidence that managers consider the personal taxes of their shareholders in issuing dividends and 
repurchasing shares. 
 
How Quickly Did Investors and Managers Respond to JGTRRA? 
All of the tests so far in this paper aggregate dividends and repurchases over the eight 
quarters before enactment and the eight quarters after enactment, creating two observations 
(before and after JGTRRA) for each firm.  As discussed above, the reason for aggregation is that, 
unlike regular, quarterly dividends, repurchases are irregular events, which can lead to highly 
volatile quarterly measures of DIV%.  In this section, we relax this restriction and treat each 
quarter as a different observation, resulting in 16 observations for each firm.  The reason that we 
shift to quarterly measures here is to enable us to pinpoint the time when investors and managers 
responded to JGTRRA.   
To get GMM quarterly coefficient estimates for the same key six variables examined 
throughout this study, we suppress the intercept and include a categorical variable for each 30 
 
quarter from the earliest quarter (eight quarters before enactment—the quarter including May 
2001) to the most recent quarter (eight quarters after enactment—the quarter including May 
2005).  We then interact the categorical variable for each of the 16 quarters with the six variables 
of interest.   
Table 6 reports 16 quarters of GMM coefficient estimates for the six key variables for the 
Dividend Payers sample.  We find little change across the quarters for the three tax clientele 
regressions.  That is not surprising for estimates when NONEXEC or MF is the dependent 
variable because we find no evidence anywhere in this study that suggests that non-executive 
individuals or mutual fund investors rebalanced their portfolios in favor of stocks that pay a 
larger portion of their payouts through dividends.  However, because we find some support for 
clientele effects among insiders, it is a bit surprising that we cannot detect any cross-quarter 
changes in coefficient estimates. 
Conversely, for manager responses to JGTRRA, we find a sharp increase in the quarterly 
coefficient estimates during the second quarter following passage, which would be the quarter 
ending December 31, 2003, for most companies (i.e., those with March, June, September and 
December year-ends).  In eight of the nine quarters before then, including the quarter 
immediately following the quarter of enactment (quarter +1), the INSIDER coefficient is 
negative.  Beginning with quarter +2, the INSIDER coefficient is positive in every quarter, 
except one, and significantly greater than zero in four of the seven quarters.  Likewise, the 
quarterly pattern for the NONEXEC coefficients shows a similar break in quarter +2.  The 
NONEXEC coefficient is negative during all nine quarters before quarter +2.  The coefficient 
turns positive in that quarter and remains positive in four of the remaining six quarters.  
Similarly, the MF coefficient is negative in six of the eight pre-enactment quarters and negative 31 
 
only once thereafter.  The MF coefficient is actually positive in quarter +1, but its coefficient 
triples from quarter +1 to quarter +2.   
We conclude from the quarterly findings that companies with disproportionately large 
individual ownership began to substantially adjust their payout policy in response to JGTRRA 
during the last quarter of 2003 and the changes were sustained for the remainder of the 
investigation period.  A delay of one quarter before firms responded to the tax incentives of 
individual investors is consistent with firms being unable or unwilling to respond to the new tax 
rates in the quarter immediately following passage.  Perhaps they had already made their 
dividend and repurchase decisions for the third quarter of 2003 by May 2003.  However, by the 
last quarter of 2003, it appears that firms held disproportionately by individuals were beginning 
to shift from repurchases to dividends, at the margin.   
This delay of one quarter may partially explain Brown et al. (2007)’s inability to find 
non-dividend initiators substituting dividends for share repurchases in 2003 and Aboody and 
Kasznick’s (2008) failure to link repurchases, stock options, and individual ownership.  Both 
studies treat all dividends paid and shares repurchased in 2003 as post-enactment payouts.
25  If 
few firms were adjusting their distribution policy before the last quarter of 2003 and, in fact, 
firms were making distribution choices before then, as though prior tax law applied (as implied 
                                                           
25 Our quarterly results, indicating no response to JGTRRA before the second half of 2003 and very little until the 
last quarter of 2003, raise concerns about the pre/post JGTRRA classifications in Brown et al. (2007), Chetty and 
Saez (2006, 2005), and Aboody and Kasznik (2008).  Those studies treat all dividends paid and shares repurchased 
in 2003 as responses to JGTRRA, even those declared months before the May 23rd passage of the legislation, (e.g., 
Microsoft’s initial dividend announcement on January 7, 2003).  By using the day that the dividends were paid, they 
even include some dividends declared in 2002, well before President Bush ever mentioned possible dividend tax 
relief in January 2003.  Brav et al. (2007) state that it is implausible that firms were so clairvoyant that they declared 
tax-motivated dividends months before passage.  Among other factors, President Bush’s initial comments were 
vague and preliminary, and weeks passed before details of his proposal emerged.  Furthermore, passage of the 
highly controversial legislation was uncertain until Vice-President Richard Cheney cast a tie-breaking vote in the 
U.S. Senate to gain passage of the legislation. 32 
 
by the negative coefficients), then it is understandable that their tests would have struggled to 
detect any movement from repurchases to dividends. 
 
V.  CLOSING REMARKS 
This paper extends our understanding of the effects of shareholder taxes on firm payout 
policy by estimating a system of equations to quantify the investor and managerial responses to 
the unprecedented 2003 cuts in dividend and capital gains tax rates.  We hypothesize that, in 
response to the legislation, individual investors (the only ones affected by the rate reductions) 
rebalanced their portfolios to increase their dividend income while firms boosted the portion of 
their profits that they returned as dividends.  Comparing firm-level individual ownership and 
dividend-repurchase mix, before and after 2003, we find evidence consistent with directors and 
officers rebalancing their portfolios, but not other individual investors.  We also find evidence 
consistent with those firms with large individual ownership boosted the dividend portion of their 
total payouts.  The payouts adjustments began a few months following enactment of the tax cuts.  
The regression coefficient estimates imply that both the portfolio rebalancing and distribution 
policy changes following JGTRRA were economically significant.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate investor and managerial responses to 
JGTRRA using simultaneous equations.  We find that the results are much stronger than they 
would have been if we had used standard OLS estimates of separate regressions, consistent with 
investors and managers acting concurrently.  Both statistical and economic significance 
increased substantially using GMM.  Furthermore, this is the most comprehensive analysis of the 
JGTRRA to date.  Other studies focus on either investor responses or managerial responses; we 
study both.  We analyze the set of firms that pay almost all dividends (i.e., non-dividend 33 
 
initiators, three different groups of individual investors (insiders, non-executive individuals, and 
mutual funds), and the 16 quarters centered on passage of the legislation.  The methodological 
and sample enhancements enable us to construct a more powerful test of the association between 
shareholder taxes and corporate distribution policy.    
Finally, the results in this paper suggest that additional research is needed to understand 
the role of insiders in the interaction of shareholder taxes and distribution policies.  We find that 
insiders are the only individuals who rebalanced their portfolio in response to the rate changes.  
We also find that firms were particularly responsive to the changed tax incentives if directors and 
officers held large positions.  These results join Brown, et al.’s (2007) finding that insiders 
played key roles in initiating dividends at the expense of share repurchases in 2003 to suggest 
that corporate governance needs to be introduced into analyses of the shareholder tax-payout 
choice.  Questions that future research could explore include the following: To what extent are 
insiders motivated by their own personal tax considerations when setting distribution policy?  
How do the tax incentives of insiders affect the returns to other investors?  From a distribution 
policy perspective, did other individual investors benefit from holding stocks in companies with 
high insider interests while non-individual shareholdings suffered?  To what extent does 
compensation of executives with stock affect a firm’s distribution policy?  To what extent do 
changes in shareholder taxes affect a firm’s value differently depending on the extent of its 
insider holdings?  We look forward to answers to these and similar questions in future studies.  34 
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Means and Medians for Regression Variables 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the 421 (294) firms that paid dividends (both dividends and repurchases) in 
the period surrounding the JGTRRA.  Total Dividends is dividends as reported by Compustat (data16xdata61).  If the 
firm uses the treasury stock method, Total Repurchases is the change in treasury stock (data98).  If there is a net 
decrease in treasury stock, Total Repurchases is set to zero (i.e.,  if there are net stock issuances).  If the firm does not 
use the treasury stock method, then Total Repurchases is  the repurchase amount from the statement of cash flows (data 
93) less decreases in preferred stock (change in data55 and data71).  Dividends per Assets is Total Dividends scaled by 
lagged assets (data44).  Repurchases per Assets is Total Repurchases scaled by lagged assets (data44).  DIV% is Total 
Dividends over the sum of Total Dividends and Total Repurchases.  INSIDER is the percentage of shares held by 
insiders as measured by holdings of directors and officers as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data. 
NONEXEC is one less the percentage of shares that are held by institutional investors as reported in 13-F filings and 
collected by Thomson Financial’s Institutional Holdings database less INSIDER less non-officer/director beneficial 
owners as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing data.  MF is the percentage of the firm owned by mutual funds 
as reported in 13-F filings and collected by Thomson Financial’s Institutional Holdings database.   RE is lagged retained 
earnings scaled by lagged assets (data58/data44).  PERM is operating income (data21 – data5 – data22) scaled by 
lagged assets (data44).  TRANS is net income scaled by lagged assets (data69/data44) less PERM.  FCF is defined as 
income before extraordinary items (data 8) plus interest expense (data 22) less the change in the applicable balance 
sheet accounts: (assets (data44), liabilities (data54), debt (data45, data51)) scaled by lagged assets (data44).  DYIELD is 
the lagged ratio of dividends per share to price, expressed in percentages (data16/data14).  LEVERAGE is lagged long-
term debt (data51 + data 45) scaled by lagged assets (data44).  SIZE is the natural log of assets (data44).  S&PRATING 
is the S&P Common Stock Ranking (SPCSR 7 = A+ etc)÷100.  AGE is the number of years the firm is reported on 
CRSP÷100 as of 2003.  SP500 is 1 if the firm is in the S&P500 Index, 0 otherwise.  LIQUIDITY is the log of average 
monthly volume over shares outstanding for the prior year.  BETA is market beta estimated over the prior 12 months.  
IRISK is unsystematic risk, which is estimated as the standard deviation of daily market model residuals over the prior 
year multiplied by 100.  MKTADJRET is the market adjusted returns over the prior year expressed as a%.  SALESGR 
average sales growth over the prior two years (data2/data44).  R&DINT is R&D intensity estimated as R&D expense 
over lagged assets (data4/data44).  Missing R&D is set to zero. 38
 
 Dividends 
421 firms  
(at least one dividend before 
enactment of the JGTRRA) 
  Dividend Payers and Repurchasers 
Sample 
294 firms  
(at least one dividend and one 
repurchase before enactment of the 
JGTRRA) 
  MEANS MEDIANS    MEANS  MEDIANS 
 Before  After  Before After    Before After Before  After 
Total Dividends  152 200 17 27*    193 252  19  30  * 
Total Repurchases  140 251 2  3    200 327  13  9  * 
Dividends per Assets  0.03 0.04  *  0.02  0.03    0.03 0.04  * 0.02 0.03 
Repurchases per Assets  0.03 0.04 0.00  0.00    0.05 0.05  0.01 0.01  ** 
DIV%  0.78 0.78 0.89  0.89    0.68 0.72  0.75 0.81  ** 
INSIDER  0.10 0.09 0.04  0.04    0.11 0.09  0.05 0.04 
NONEXEC  0.35  0.30 **  0.32  0.25 **    0.35  0.30 **  0.30  0.25 ** 
MF  0.27  0.29 *  0.26  0.29 **    0.26  0.29 *  0.26  0.29 *  
RE  0.32 0.32 0.32  0.32    0.34 0.33  0.34 0.36 
PERM  0.16 0.18  *  0.13  0.16  *    0.18 0.20  0.16 0.18 
TRANS  -0.07 -0.07 -0.06  -0.06   -0.08  -0.08 -0.07  -0.07 
FCF  0.06  0.02 **  0.08  0.03 **    0.07  0.03 **  0.08  0.04 ** 
DYIELD  0.53 0.44 0.40  0.36    0.55 0.43  0.38 0.37 
LEVERAGE  0.22 0.20  *  0.22  0.18  *    0.21 0.18  0.20 0.17 
SIZE  6.85 7.03 6.74  6.93    6.94 7.12  6.74 6.94 
S&PRATING  12  13 **  16  16 **    11  13 **  16  16 * 
AGE  25 25 22  22    25 25  22 22 
SP500  0.23 0.24 0  0    0.25 0.26  0  0 
LIQUIDITY  -0.50  -0.21 **  -0.36  -0.14 **    -0.48  -0.23 **  -0.30  -0.14** 
BETA  0.63  0.92 **  0.60  0.92 **    0.65  0.91 **  0.61  0.90 ** 
IRISK  2.46  1.83 **  2.29  1.67 **    2.42  2.26 **  1.81  1.63 ** 
MKTADJRET  0.12  0.05 **  0.12  0.03 **    0.11  0.05 **  0.11  0.03 ** 
SALESGR  0.12  0.26 **  0.06  0.19 **    0.11  0.23 **  0.06  0.18 ** 
R&DINT  0.01 0.01 0  0    0.01 0.01  0  0 
* (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level, using a two-tailed test39
TABLE 2 
Estimated Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares, where the Dependent Variables are the percentages of Ownerships by Insider, Non-
Executive and Mutual Fund and the Observations Aggregate Eight Quarters Before and After Enactment of the JGTRRA  
 
This table reports estimated regression statistics for the 421 (294) firms that paid dividends (both dividends and repurchases) in the period surrounding the JGTRRA.  
POST is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the dividend/repurchase was declared in the eight quarters after 5/23/03; zero, otherwise.  All other variables are 
defined in Table 1.    
 
 
   Equation 1: INSIDER  
(Insider % Ownership) 
Equation (2): NONEXEC  
(Non-Executive % Ownership) 
Equation (3): MF  
(Mutual Fund % Ownership) 
 Pred  Dividend 
Payers  








Dividend Payers & 
Repurchasers 
Intercept    -0.027  -0.040  0.273 **  0.300 **  0.414 **  0.422 ** 
POST   -0.013  -0.006  0.049  0.022  -0.020  -0.020 
DIV%   -0.006  0.021  -0.008  -0.039  0.022  0.003 
DIV% * 
POST 
(+)  0.048  0.038  -0.004  0.003  -0.026  -0.011 
S&PRATING    -0.029  -0.018  -0.144  -0.020  0.002 *  0.184 * 
AGE    -0.084 **  -0.063  0.064  0.072  -0.037  -0.076 * 
SP500    -0.001  -0.011  0.030  0.023  -0.093 **  -0.082 ** 
LIQUIDITY    -0.045 **  -0.044 **  -0.107 **  -0.108 **  0.094 **  0.089 ** 
BETA    -0.011  -0.003  -0.082 **  -0.068 **  0.030 **  0.028 ** 
IRISK    2.211 **  2.543 **  5.831 **  2.968 **  -3.785 **  -2.783 ** 
MKTADJRET    11.088 *  15.281 **  14.383  12.398  -7.804  -9.263 
SALESGR   0.015  0.019  0.004  -0.019  -0.016  -0.004 
R&DINT    0.133  0.191  -0.173  -0.423 *  -0.291 **  -0.255 * 
n    842 588 842 588 842 588 
 
* (**) indicate that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level, using a one-tailed test where there are predictions; otherwise, using a two-tailed tests40
TABLE 3 
Estimated Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares, where the Dependent Variable is the percentage 
of Shareholder Payouts that are Dividends and the Observations Aggregate Eight Quarters Before and 
After Enactment of the JGTRRA 
 
This table reports estimated regression statistics for the 421 (294) firms that paid dividends (both dividends and 
repurchases) in the period surrounding the JGTRRA.  POST is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the 
dividend/repurchase was declared in eight quarters after 5/23/03; zero, otherwise.  All other variables are defined in 
Table 1.    
 
          Equation (4): DIV%   
 Pred  Dividend Payers (n=842) Dividend Payers & Repurchasers (n=588)
Intercept    0.95 **  0.94 ** 
POST   -0.03  -0.03   
INSIDER   -0.01  -0.02 
INSIDER*POST   (+)  0.28 *  0.31 * 
NONEXEC   0.02  -0.04 
NONEXEC*POST  (+) 0.02  0.06 
MF   0.03  -0.15 
MF*POST  (+) 0.04  0.09 
RE    0.11 **  0.10 ** 
PERM    -0.42 **  -0.28 ** 
TRANS   0.14  0.25 
FCF    -0.16 **     -0.16 ** 
DYIELD    0.11   0.14  
LEVERAGE   0.08  0.01 
SIZE    -0.02 **  -0.02 * 
Industry dummies?    Yes  yes 
 
* (**) indicate that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level, using a one-tailed test where there are predictions; 
otherwise, using a two-tailed test 41
TABLE 4 
Estimated Coefficients (p-values) from Generalized Method of Moments where the Dependent 
Variables are the percentage of Shareholder Payouts that are Dividend and percentages of 
Ownerships by Insiders, Individuals, and Mutual Funds and the Observations Aggregate Eight 
Quarters Before and After Enactment of the JGTRRA 
 
This table reports estimated regression statistics for the 421 (294) firms that paid dividends (both dividends and 
repurchases) in the period surrounding the JGTRRA.  POST is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the 
dividend/repurchase was declared in the eight quarters after 5/23/03; zero, otherwise.  Note that all control variables in 
Tables 2 and 3 are included in the estimation of the model but excluded from the table for brevity.  All other variables 

















Dividend Payers & 
Repurchasers  
(n=588) 
1  INSIDER DIV%*POST (+)  0.11 *  0.10 
         
2  NONEXEC DIV%*POST  (+)  0.09  -0.04 
         
3  MF DIV%*POST  (+) -0.02  0.01 
         
4  DIV%  INSIDER*POST   (+)  0.32 **  0.42 ** 
4  DIV%  NONEXEC*POST  (+)  0.19 *  0.18 * 
4  DIV%  MF*POST  (+)  0.28 *  0.33 * 
 
* (**) indicate that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level, using a one-tailed test.42
TABLE 5 
Estimated Coefficients (p-values) from Generalized Method of Moments where the Dependent Variables are the 
percentage of Shareholder Payouts that are Dividend and the percentages of Ownerships by Insiders, 
Individuals, and Mutual Funds; Comparison of Quarters Surrounding Various Non-event Periods and 
Quarters Surrounding the Enactment of the JGTRRA, sample are firms that issue at least one dividend during 
the two years preceding the assumed date of legislative passage 
 
This table reports estimated regression statistics for the 421 firms that paid dividends in the period surrounding the 
JGTRRA from Table 4.  POST is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the dividend/repurchase was declared in the 
eight quarters after 5/23/03; zero, otherwise.  Note that all control variables in Tables 2 and 3 are included in the 
estimation of the model but excluded from the table for brevity.  All other variables are defined in Table 1.    
 
Equation  1  2 3 4  4 4 
Dependent Variable INSIDER  NONEXEC  MF  DIV%  DIV%  DIV% 














(from Table 4) 
 
 
0.11 *  0.09 
 
 







          
Assume Law Had Passed 
in May of: 
        
1994  -0.04  0.23 0.01 0.15  0.03 0.02 
1995  -0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.22  * 0.08  0.02 
1996  0.01  0.21 0.01 0.16 0.20  *  0.24 
1997  -0.02  0.04  0.02  -0.07  -0.02 -0.05 
1998  0.09  -0.14  0.03  -0.18 -0.20  * 0.01 
1999  -0.10  -0.12  0.04  -0.22 -0.15 0.13 
2000  0.05  0.03  -0.02  -0.17  0.01 0.13 
2001  0.15  *  -0.01 -0.08  0.14  0.01 -0.01 
          
Descriptive Stats for 
1994—2001 
Coefficients 
    
 
  
Mean  0.02  0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.06 
Median  -0.01  0.04 0.01 0.04  0.01 0.02 
Standard Deviation  0.08  0.14 0.04 0.18  0.13 0.10 
Maximum  0.15  0.23 0.04 0.22  0.20 0.24 
Prob that 2003 
coefficient could be 
randomly drawn from a 
distribution of 1994-
2001 coefficients using 
t-test (sign test)  0.02 (0.07)  0.38 (0.73) 0.21 (0.38) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01)
 
* (**) indicate that the estimated regression coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level.  Bold and 
italicized coefficients are significantly different from their 2003 counterparts at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 6  
Estimated Coefficients (p-values) from Generalized Method of Moments where the Dependent Variables are the percentage of 
Shareholder Payouts that are Dividend and the percentages of Ownerships by Insiders, Individuals, and Mutual Funds,  
where each of the 16 quarters surrounding the enactment of the JGTRRA are treated as separate observations and the firms are the 421 
firms that issued dividends at least once during the 2 years before JGTRRA 
 
This table reports estimated regression statistics for the 421 firms that paid dividends in the period surrounding the JGTRRA.  EVENT is a categorical variable 
that equals 1 if the dividend was declared in applicable quarter; zero, otherwise.  Note that all control variables in Tables 2 and 3 are included in the estimation of 
the model but excluded from the table for brevity.  All other variables are defined in Table 1.    
 
 
Equation 1  2 3 4  4  4 
Dependent 
Variable 















-8  -0.01 -0.02  0.02  -0.17  -0.18  -0.08 
-7  0.01 -0.01  0.03  -0.07  -0.08  0.20 
-6  -0.03  -0.02  0.02  -0.32 **  -0.25 *  -0.15 
-5  -0.01 0.01  0.01 -0.18  -0.13  -0.09 
-4  0.02  -0.07 **   0.03 *  0.08  -0.15  -0.01 
-3  -0.01 -0.05  *  0.03  -0.01  -0.05  -0.01 
-2  0.01 -0.05  0.04  *  -0.06  -0.14  0.01 
-1  -0.00 -0.01  -0.00  -0.09  -0.14  -0.38  * 
Enactment 
Quarter 
n/a n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
+1  -0.00 -0.01  0.02  -0.04  -0.03  0.06 
+2  0.02 0.00  0.01  0.27  * 0.06  0.18 
+3  0.02 -0.02  0.02  0.30  * 0.10  0.23 
+4  0.01 -0.01  0.01  0.19  0.07  0.22 
+5  -0.02 0.02  0.02  0.20  0.34  **  0.52 ** 
+6  -0.00 0.00  -0.02 -0.03  -0.11  -0.11 
+7  0.04 *  -0.03  -0.01  0.25 *  -0.11  0.00 
+8  0.01 0.01  -0.01  0.26  * 0.19  0.14 
 
* (**) indicate that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level, using two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
 